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1.  Introduction 
 
While economists have always acknowledged that there is an important link between religion and 
economic behavior (a tradition that goes back to Adam Smith and Max Weber; see Iannaccone, 
1998, for a survey), one of the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 was a renewed 
interest in this topic (Barro, 2001).  Recent research has focused on the relationship between 
religion and education (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001); on whether economic development affects 
religious beliefs (Barro and McCleary, 2002) or whether religious beliefs affect economic 
outcomes (Barro and McCleary, 2003, Noland, 2003, Gruber, 2005); on whether there is a 
relationship between religious beliefs and behaviors (like trust and attitude towards private 
ownership) that are conducive to economic development (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2003); 
and on the relationship between religion and terrorist activities (Berman, 2003, and Iannaccone, 
2003). 
  In this paper we focus on the relationship between religion and education gender gap and 
test whether Muslim households discriminate against the education of girls. This is an important 
topic because the recent events gave new voice to those who identify Islam as a cultural zone 
with values in contrast with those of the West.
1 One aspect in which Islam is often perceived as 
having different values from those of “western culture” is the extent of respect for personal 
freedom, especially that of women.  While there are some papers that use individual-level data to 
study the relationship between religion and education using samples of US women (see, for 
instance, Keysar and Kosmin, 1995, and Leher, 1999, and 2005; the latter paper provides an 
updated survey of this literature), we were not able to find any paper that explicitly focuses on 
Muslim women.
2  
                                                           
1 There are plenty of examples. A letter to the Economist (December 21, 2002) reads as follows: “SIR – 
Turkey clearly does not belong in Europe. Indeed, no Muslim country does. The issue is not one of Turkish 
reforms failing to meet EU standards but of an incompatible and primitive culture serving as a Trojan horse 
for the rest of Islam's impoverished masses.” (Karl Kettler, Flemington, New Jersey). During 2001 and 
2002, a book (Fallaci, 2001) that emphasized the incompatibility of Islam and “Western Values” (and, 
according to the author, the clear superiority of the latter) topped the Italian and French best seller lists. 
2 An interesting paper that compares labor supply of Muslim, Christian and Jewish women in Israel is 
Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (1998).  The work by Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) is also related to 
ours but while they focus on how education affects religious attendance and membership to different 
religious groups, we focus on the opposite question and test whether belonging to a given religious group 
affects education outcomes. 
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Anecdotal evidence seems to support the view that Islam discriminates against women 
both de jure and de facto. Some Muslim countries impose serious constraints on the ability of 
women to conduct what is, by western standard, considered a normal life (in Saudi Arabia, 
women cannot drive, not to mention vote) and even the most liberal Middle Eastern countries 
often have legislation that explicitly discriminate against women (in Lebanon, for instance, 
women do not transmit citizenship to their spouses or children).  There exists in fact some cross-
country evidence that indicates that women tend to fare worse in countries where a majority of 
the population is Muslim. Table 1, for instance, looks at the cross-country correlation between 
various indicators of education gender gap and share of individuals belonging to a given religion 
and shows that Muslim countries tend to be characterized by a wider gender gap.
3 In particular, 
point estimates indicate that, once one controls for GDP per capita, the gender gap in secondary 
enrollment increases by almost 50 percent when one moves from a country where 100 percent of 
the population is Christian to a country where 100 percent of the population is Muslim. Along 
similar lines, Boone (1996) finds that Muslim countries are characterized by greater gender 
oppression, and Dollar and Gatti (1999) find that in Muslim countries women have lower 
secondary school attainment, lower life expectancy, less equality in marriage, and less political 
representation. 
But looking at country averages can be misleading. Fukuyama (2001a, 2001b), for 
instance, criticizes the “clash of civilization” view put forward by Huntington (1996) and 
suggests that countries behave differently only because they are at different stages of the 
modernization process. Moaddel’s (1998) historical analysis of the relationship between Islam 
and gender oppression also emphasizes the role of economic development (for a recent discussion 
of Islam and gender see Kazemi, 2000). If looking across countries cannot provide enough 
information to test for the presence of different values between Islam and western culture, 
looking at individuals within a country may be a better strategy. In order to do so, it is necessary 
to find a country with deep religious cleavages and limited mixing among groups. Lebanon is a 
                                                           
3 In all regressions, the dependent variables measure the differential between male and female education in 
percentage terms. We use four variables for the education gender gap: (i) ED25 measures the difference 
between average years of education of males and females aged 25 years or more; (ii) ED15 does the same 
for individuals aged 15 or more; (iii) Primary measures the differential between male and female primary 
school enrollment; and (iv) Secondary measures the differential between male and female secondary school 
enrollment. The first two variables are from the Barro and Lee (1996) data-set and the last two and GDP 
per capita are from the World Bank’s World Development indicators.  Data on religion are from La Porta et 
al. (1999). All regressions refer to the early 1990s.   4
perfect laboratory. It is characterized by a large number of geographically-segregated religious 
groups and limited marriages between members of the different groups.
4  
In this paper, we use individual-level data from Lebanon to test whether there are 
differences between education gender gaps of Muslims and Christians. We focus on education 
because this is the main form of investment in human capital. As Lebanon is a fairly traditional 
society where the parents tend to make decisions on the education of their children, it is 
reasonable to think that if parents of a given religion tend to assign more value to boys than girls 
this should be reflected in different education gender gaps across religions (Alderman and 
Gertler, 1997, discuss the reason why parents may invest more in the education of boys). 
Therefore, the education gender gap should be a good measure of de facto discrimination against 
girls. Another advantage of using education is that it can be easily measured (even though our 
measure does not allow controlling for the quality of education). As research found that nutrition 
at young age may affect schooling outcome (Glewwe, Jacoby, and King, 2000), our tests could 
even capture a stronger form of discrimination against girls; i.e., differences in nutrition at young 
age. 
Contrary to what one would expect and to what is suggested by the cross-country 
experience, we find that in Lebanon both Muslim and Christian women receive more education 
than their male counterparts.
5 Furthermore, we find no significant difference between the 
education gender gap of Muslims and Christians. 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) is the paper that is closest to ours.  Using 
individual-level data for a sample of 56 countries, they test the relationship between intensity of 
religious beliefs and economic attitude. Among the variables they examine, one is closely related 
to that in our paper. In particular, they study the relationship between religion and the answer to 
the following question: “Do men deserve university education more than women?” They find that 
both Christians (Catholic and Protestant) and Muslims tend to agree with this statement more than 
individuals who declare to have no religious affiliation. However, contrary to what is found in our 
paper, they find that the attitude against the education of women is stronger for Muslims than for 
Christians. There are at least four differences between this paper and Guiso, Sapienza, and 
                                                           
4 While we do not have hard evidence to substantiate this claim (there are no statistics on intermarriage), 
we would like to point out that civil marriage is not allowed by Lebanese law and couples who belong to 
different regions need to travel abroad in order to get married.  
5 This finding is not uncommon. In a study of 41developing countries, Filmer (1999) shows that 16 
countries have a female advantage in the enrollment of 6 to 11 year-olds and 10 countries have a female 
advantage in the enrollment of 12 to 14 year-olds.   5
Zingales (2003). First of all, while we only focus on one country in which approximately 70 
percent of the population is Muslim and the remaining 30 percent is Christian (these data are from 
the CIA World Factbook), they focus on a large sample of countries with a very small percentage 
of Muslims (approximately 5 percent).  Second, they focus on attitudes and we focus on 
outcomes. Third, our paper only focuses on the denomination of the religious group to which the 
individual is affiliated, while Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) also measure the intensity of 
religious beliefs.
6 Fourth, while the estimations of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) control 
for individual characteristics, our estimations are based on a large sample of Lebanese households 
(the survey covers more than 7 percent of the population) that allows controlling for both 
individual characteristics and household fixed effects. Hence, we can identify the difference in 
education gender gaps by looking at the different behavior of brothers and sisters in Muslim and 
Christian households.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the data used in the paper. 
Section three tests whether religion is an important determinant of female education focusing on 
the two main religious groups present in Lebanon (Muslim and Christian) and conducts a wide 




This paper’s estimations are based on data from the 1996 Lebanese Population and Housing 
Survey (PHS) conducted by the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs. The PHS is a nationally 
representative survey that covers 61,580 households and 290,000 individuals (more than 7 
percent of the total population; the Palestinian camps were excluded from the survey). The same 
survey has been used by Krueger and Maleckova (2002) to study the relationship between 
poverty and terrorist activities, by El-Khoury and Panizza (2005) to study the relationship 
between religion and social mobility, and by Hajj and Panizza (2002) to study the relationship 
between religion, fertility, and labor market participation. 
                                                           
6 The inability to separate individuals according to the intensity of their beliefs is a clear weakness of our 
data. It should be pointed out, however, that our results (showing that there is no evidence that Muslims 
discriminate more than Christians) would be reversed only if one were ready to assume that either there is a 
negative correlation between intensity of beliefs and gender gap or that the average Lebanese Christian is 
more religious than the average Lebanese Muslim.   6
The survey contains a wealth of information on household assets and living conditions 
and provides data on the main characteristics (age, gender, education, relationship to the head, 
etc.) of household members.  Although the survey does not contain direct information on 
household wealth (or income) and religious status, El-Khoury and Panizza (2005) show that it is 
possible to use the information contained in the survey to code religion and build a proxy for 
household wealth. In particular, they use two different sources of information to code religion. 
First of all, they code as Muslim all the polygamous households. As polygamy is a sufficient but 
not necessary condition for the identification of a Muslim household (polygamy is illegal for 
Christians), this strategy allows to code only 1 percent of the households included in the sample. 
To code the other households included in the sample, El-Khoury and Panizza (2005) exploit the 
geographical segregation of the various religious groups and match religion with the district of 
registration of the household.  
Following El-Khoury and Panizza (2005), we use data on polygamy and then obtain 
information on the religious composition of the Lebanese districts from the indicators and results 
for the 1996 national parliamentary election (information on religion is available because the 
Lebanese parliament is elected on a sectarian basis; the data are from Fghali, 1999, and are 
summarized in Table 2) and adopt the following coding strategy: (i) we code as Muslim 
individuals who are registered in districts where at least 80 percent of registered voters are 
Muslim; (ii) we code as Christian individuals who are registered in districts where at least 80 
percent of registered voters are Christian; (iii) we do not code individuals who are registered in 
districts where there is no clear Muslim or Christian majority.
7 One advantage of having data on 
voters’ registration rather than participation is that, as registration is automatic for all individuals 
aged 18 or above, our estimations are not biased by the possibility that some religious groups are 
more likely to be registered than other religious groups.   
There are at least two caveats with the way we code religion. First, we cannot code the 
entire Lebanese population. In particular, while the household survey contains information for 
approximately 71,000 (first panel of Table 3) Lebanese aged 7 to 20 who still live with their 
                                                           
7 The exception to rules (ii) and (iii) is for polygamous households who are always coded as Muslim 
(however, our sample has no polygamous household that was coded as Christian according to rule (ii)) . El-
Khoury and Panizza (2005) show that it is also possible to implement a finer (but less precise) coding of 
religion and divide Lebanese households into Muslim Sunni, Muslim Shiite, Christian Maronite and other 
Christians. While we do not adopt this finer division, it is important to note that the main result of this 
paper (i.e., no difference between Christians and Muslims and no difference between the different Muslims 
and Christians denominations) still hold if we adopt this finer division.     7
parents (we discuss below why this is the relevant sample), we have data on religion for 
approximately 42,000 (second panel of Table 3) Lebanese aged 7 to 20 who still live with their 
parents. Second, we cannot be sure that all households allocated to a given religious group belong 
to that particular group.  
In the empirical analysis, we address these issues by checking the robustness of our 
results to alternative coding of religion, by using a sub-sample where there is a perfect match 
between religion and district of registration, and by analyzing the behavior of polygamous 
households. We also show that the characteristics of the sub-sample for which we have data on 
religion are not different from the characteristics of the Lebanese population.  
It is important to note that the household survey contains information on both the district 
of residence and the district of registration of the household and that we code religion using 
information based on the district where the household head is registered to vote. There are two 
reasons for adopting this coding strategy. First, this strategy allows us to code more households 
than if we were to base our information on the district of residence and it allows us to retain 
observations for residents of districts (like the city of Beirut) where the share of Muslims is 
similar to that of Christians. This is because many families who migrated to other districts are still 
officially registered in their districts of origin (in some cases this is true even for families who 
have been living in the new district for more than a generation).  Consider for instance the case of 
Beirut. If we were to code religion according to the district of residence, we would lose all the 
residents of the capital. By coding individuals according to district of registration, we are able to 
maintain 30 percent of the residents of the capital.  
The second and more important reason for using the district of registration is that by 
coding religion according to the district of registration and not residence, we make sure that the 
religion variable does not just proxy for the region where the household lives and allows us to 
control for district fixed effects and for a large number of factors capturing, among other things, 
school availability and accessibility.  
  To build a proxy of household wealth, we follow Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and use 
principal component analysis to aggregate 13 indicators of asset ownership into an index of 
household wealth. El-Khoury and Panizza (2005) argue that this is an extremely good proxy of 
household wealth. They also compute regional averages for their wealth index and show that the 
correlation between the latter and regional average household income as measured by the Central 
Administration of Statistics is 0.96.       8
 
3.  The Education Gender Gap among Young Lebanese.  Are Muslims Different? 
 
In this section, we test whether there are differences between the education gender gap of 
Muslims and Christians. In doing so, we focus on young Lebanese aged 7 to 20 years who are 
classified as a son or daughter of the household head (in households where the head is older than 
75 we consider the grandchildren of the head). We focus on this restricted sample because we 
want to control for household specific factors and, in particular, control whether the religious 
group of the household head has an effect on the education gender gap. As a consequence, we 
need to restrict our sample to individuals who still live with their parents and hence cannot 
include older individuals.   
Table 3 presents summary statistics for our sample of young Lebanese.  The first panel of 
the table uses data for all young Lebanese, the second panel restricts the sample to households for 
which we have information on religion, the third panel focuses on Muslims, and the last panel on 
Christians. The table shows that the summary statistics for the sub-sample for which we have 
information on religion (second panel of Table 3) are almost identical to those for the national 
sample (first panel of Table 3). The table also shows that Muslim households seem to be 
characterized by lower wealth than their Christian counterparts and also by lower education of 
children and parents. The difference is particularly large for parents’ education, with Christian 
parents having between 2 and 3 more years of education than Muslim parents.  
Note that approximately 75 percent of young Lebanese included in our sample are 
Muslim and 25 percent are Christian, indicating that in our sample the percentage of Muslim is 
higher than in the figures reported by the CIA Factbook (according to which 70 percent of 
Lebanese are Muslim and 30 percent Christian).  This is probably due to the fact that Muslim 
households tend to have higher fertility rate and hence the Muslim population tend to be younger 
than the Christian population. 
 
3.1 Baseline Estimations 
 
To test for a possible relationship between religion and education gender gap, we start by running 
the following regression: 
   9
ij j ij ij ij ij ij u X AGE AGE FM F ED + + + + + + = ' 2 2 1 χ γ γ δ β α    (1) 
 
Where  ij ED is the education of individual iof household j, F is a dummy variable that takes 
value one for women, FM is a dummy variable that takes value one for Muslim women, AGE and 
AGE2 are individual i’s age and its square, and X is a matrix of household specific 
characteristics (religion, wealth and its square, father and mothers’s age and education and their 
squares, father and mother’s occupational status, and number of children in the household) and it 
also includes district of residence fixed effects. Within the setting of Equation (1), β  measures 
the (negative of the) education gender gap for Christians,  δ β + measures the (negative of the) 
education gender gap for Muslims, andδ  the differential between the two education gender gaps. 
The latter is our parameter of interest.   
As we do not have data on religion for all Lebanese households, we need to assume that 
the education gender gap for the households for which we do have data does not differ from the 
whole survey. In order to test this assumption, we start by running a regression using the whole 
survey and a regression using the sub-sample for which we have information on religion, and then 
compare the coefficients of these two regressions (clearly these two regressions do not include 
FM which is not available for the whole sample). The first two columns of Table 4 indicate that 
the two samples yield very similar results. In particular, both regressions suggest the presence of 
a statistically significant negative education gender gap (i.e., other things equal, girls are more 
educated than boys) of approximately 0.4 years (0.422 for the whole survey, column 1, and 0.445 
for the sample with information on religion, column 2). All other coefficients are as expected and 
almost identical in the two samples. In particular, we find that education is positively correlated 
with household wealth and parents’ education. Education of the children is positively correlated 
with mother’s age but uncorrelated with the age of the father. Finally, parents’ employment status 
does not seem to play an important role in determining children’s level of education (the 
coefficients are either insignificant or statistically significant but extremely small). This is 
probably because the effect of employment status is captured in household wealth, which is also a 
better measure of permanent income, and hence a more appropriate determinant of investment in 
education.  
Column 3 estimates Equation (1) and tests whether there are differences between the 
education gender gap for Muslims and Christians. It finds that, other things equal, Christian   10
females have 0.49 years of education more than their male counterparts and Muslim females have 
0.43 (computed as 0.49-0.06) years of education more than their male counterparts. The 
difference (0.06 years of education which correspond to less than one month) is extremely small 
and is not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no evidence of a difference between 
the attitude towards female education of Muslim parents and the attitude towards female 
education of Christian parents.  Notice that while there is no gender effect, the estimations of 
Table 4 indicate that, other things equal, Muslim children (both boys and girls) tend to receive 
less education than Christian children. This differential, however, is small (0.075 years of 
education) and not statistically significant.   
These results show that, in Lebanon, neither Muslims nor Christians discriminate against 
female education. In fact, if anything, females receive more education than their male 
counterparts. While this latter result is in line with evidence for other developing countries (see, 
for instance, Filmer, 2001), it is interesting in the specific case of Lebanon where Hajj and 
Panizza (2002) found that Lebanese households prefer to have boys rather than girls.
8 Despite this 
preference for boys, Lebanese households do not discriminate against the education of girls.
9  
  While the regressions of the first three columns of Table 4 control for a wealth of 
household specific factors, they cannot control for all possible elements that may affect children’s 
education and education gender gap. For instance, they cannot fully control for parents’ health 
status, neighborhood effects, and quality and type (religious versus non-religious, for instance) of 
the schools located close to the household. As omitting these factors could bias our results, we 
substitute X (ie., the matrix of household specific factors) with a set of household fixed effects.  
Formally, we estimate the following model: 
 
ij ij ij ij ij j ij u AGE AGE FM F ED + + + + + = 2 2 1 γ γ δ β α    (2) 
 
where  j α  is a set of household fixed effects. Equation (2) implicitly controls for all possible 
household specific factors and also controls for the main effect of religion. As the main effect of 
                                                           
8 In particular, they found that families that have two girls are 9 percent more likely to have a third child 
than households that have at least one boy (Angrist and Evans, 1998, find that for the US the difference is 
approximately one percent).  
9 It is unlikely that our finding that girls receive more education than boys is due to the civil war (which 
ended in 1991) because our sample focuses on young Lebanese that were younger than 15 at the time the 
war ended.   11
the MUSLIM dummy is linearly dependent with the household fixed effects, it cannot be 
included in Equation (2). The fact that we cannot include the main effect of the MUSLIM dummy 
is not a problem for our differences in differences estimation strategy because our parameter of 
interest (δ ) is identified by the presence of individuals of different gender within the same 
household. In particular, δ  measures the difference in education among brothers and sisters in 
Muslim households versus the difference in education among brothers and sisters in Christian 
households.  
While fixed effects estimations have the advantage of controlling for large series of 
household specific factors, they also have a cost because they exclude from the analysis all the 
households who only have one child in the age group considered in our sample and they may also 
amplify measurement errors. It will be therefore reassuring if fixed effects estimations and 
standard OLS yield similar results.     
As before, we start by comparing the results of a regression that includes the whole 
Lebanese population with a regression for the sub-sample of individuals for which we have 
information on religion, and show that the two samples yield similar results (columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 4). Next, we use the fixed effects model to test for differences between the education 
gender gap of Muslims and Christians (column 6 Table 4). As in column 3, the coefficient for 
Muslim women is negative but small and not statistically significant. In this case, the estimation 
suggests that Christian girls receive 0.47 years of education more than their male counterparts and 
Muslim girls receive 0.44 years of education more than their male counterparts. The difference is 
not statistically significant and, at 0.03 years of education, it is also very small (less than 1 
percent of one-standard deviation of education in the sample under study).   
The last column of Table 4 focuses on households where the head is polygamous. Even in 
this set of clearly Muslim (and probably traditional) households, we find that girls receive more 
education than boys. The difference is 0.3 years (equivalent to 4 months) and it is only one month 
lower than the value obtained for the whole sample of Lebanese households. 
  Summarizing, what do the results of Table 4 tell us about the hypothesis that Muslims 
discriminate against the education of girls? First of all, they tell us that there is no evidence that 
Muslim boys receive more education than Muslim girls. If anything, our estimations indicate that 
Muslim girls receive more education than Muslim boys. Second, they suggest that there is no 
statistically (or economically) significant difference between the education gender gap of 
Muslims and Christians. Notice that the estimations of Table 3 are based on an extremely large   12
sample of more than 42,000 individuals and, even in the fixed effects specification, the 
regressions have more than 25,000 degrees of freedom. With such a large sample, even very 
small differences are likely to show up as statistically significant. The fact that we do not find a 
statistically significant difference between the education gender gap of Christians and Muslims 
yields strong support to the hypothesis that such a difference does not exist. 
As the relationship between religion and girls’ education may not be constant across 
socio-economic groups, we re-run our baseline specification by splitting our sample according to 
three different criteria. The first focuses on the household economic status (Filmer, 1999, studies 
the interaction between wealth and gender gap). In particular, we define as rich the households 
that belong to the top two quintiles of the wealth distribution and as non-rich the households that 
belong to the bottom three quintiles. The second criterion focuses on the education of the father. 
We code as having an educated father all the households where the father has at least six years of 
education and as having a non-educated father all the households where the father has less than 
six years of education. Finally, we apply to the mothers the same criterion applied to the fathers 
and divide the households into a sample of educated mothers and a sample of non-educated 
mothers.  
  Table 5 presents the results of fixed effects regressions applied to these six sub-samples. 
The table shows that the coefficient attached to the female Muslim dummy is positive (indicating 
that, if anything, Muslim girls have an advantage with respect to their Christian counterparts) but 
close to zero and not statistically significant in the samples of rich households, households with 
educated fathers, and households with educated mothers. At the same time, the coefficient 
attached to the female Muslim dummy is negative and statistically significant in the sub-samples 
of non-rich households and households with non-educated mothers. It should be pointed out, 
however, that even in these cases the coefficients remain extremely small (oscillating between 
0.16 in the sample of non-rich households and 0.22 in the sample of non-educated mothers) 
indicating that the difference between gender gaps is always less than three months of education. 
Furthermore, all estimations of Table 5 still indicate that, other things equal, Muslim girls receive 
more education than Muslim boys (the differential ranges between 3 and 5 months).  
 
3.2 Robustness analysis 
   13
The purpose of this section is to run a battery of robustness tests to check whether the results 
discussed so far are due to misspecification of the equation or to errors in the variables. It should 
be pointed out that a problem that affects most empirical analysis, i.e., reverse causality, should 
not be an issue in this paper. We already pointed out that intermarriage is rare in Lebanon, 
furthermore it would be hard to argue that education may lead to religious switching. Therefore, 
we find it realistic to assume that religion is predetermined with respect to education and other 
economic and social factors that may affect education.  
In a study of the allocation of food within households in Bangladesh, Deolalikar (2002) 
found that first-born girls tend to be undernourished but that there is no significant difference 
between boys and non-first-born girls. If Lebanese households use a similar allocation strategy, 
the very small coefficients attached to the female dummies in the regressions of Tables 4 and 5 
could mask, by averaging all the girls in the household, substantial discrimination against first-
born girls. To test whether this is the case, we estimate the following fixed effects regression: 
 
ij ij ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij j ij
u MFCH FCH MCH CH
AGE AGE FM F ED
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
1 1 1 1
2 2 1
λ θ ϕ φ
γ γ δ β α
     (3) 
 
Where CH1 is a dummy variable that takes value one if the individual is the first child of the 
household, MCH1 is a dummy variable that takes value one if the individual is the first child and 
belongs to a Muslim household, FCH1 is a dummy variable that takes value one if the individual 
is the first child and is a girl, MFCH1 is a dummy variable that takes value one if the individual is 
the first child, is a girl and belongs to a Muslim household,  j α  is a household fixed effect , and 
all other variables are defined as in Equation (2). In this setting, β  measures the (negative of the) 
education gender gap for Christians,  δ β + measures the (negative of the) education gender gap 
for Muslims,  θ β + measures the (negative of the) education gender gap for first-born Christians, 
and  λ θ δ β + + + , measures the (negative of the) education gender gap for first-born Muslims. 
Therefore, the Muslim-Christian differentials in education gender gaps are  λ δ + for first-born 
and δ  for non first-born. Table 6 reports the estimates of equation (3) using all available 
observations and the sub-samples of rich/non-rich households and educated/non-educated 
households.  The Table shows that there is no significant first-child effect. The results are robust 
across samples. As before, we also find that in 6 out of 7 cases there is no significant difference   14
between the education gender gap of Christians and Muslims. Only in the sub-sample of non-
educated mothers, we find a marginally significant difference between the gender gaps of the two 
religious groups, but as in the previous cases, the coefficient is extremely small (0.16 years of 
education).  
Next, we recognize that there are several models that show that when households have 
limited resources and are not able to provide education for all of their children, they will find it 
optimal to concentrate all the resources in the education of one child (Becker and Tomes, 1976).  
If there is discrimination, gender may be one of the criteria that dictate the choice of the child on 
whom the family will concentrate its resources. As elementary education has very low cost (both 
in terms of tuition fees and in terms of opportunity cost), most of the possible discrimination will 
take place in secondary and higher education. As the estimations discussed so far use young 
Lebanese aged 7 to 20, they also consider primary education and may dilute the coefficient that 
measures the differential between gender gaps of Muslim and Christian households. To address 
this issue, we start by dropping all individuals younger than 11 (Table 7). As before, we find that 
girls tend to be more educated than boys and we find no significant difference between the gender 
gap of Muslims and Christians.  The same is true when we consider rich and educated households 
(in this case we even find that FM is positive indicating that the gender gap is lower for Muslims; 
the coefficient is, however, very small and insignificant). As before, we do find a statistically 
significant difference (indicating that the gender gap is greater for Muslims) in the sample with 
non-educated mothers. However, even in this case the differential between gender gaps is less 
than 4 months (0.28 years) and the estimations still indicate that, other things equal, Muslim girls 
receive more education than Muslim boys (the differential ranges between 4 and 7 months).  
Next, we restrict our sample to individuals in the 18-20 age group and test whether there 
is a correlation between religion and the probability of attending university (Table 8). We find 
that girls are always more likely to attend university than boys (even though the difference is not 
always statistically significant). We also find that in six out of seven regressions, the difference 
between gender gaps of Muslim and Christian households is small and not statistically significant. 
Only in the sample of poor households, we find that the difference between gender gaps is both 
economically and statistically significant. In this case, we find that Christian girls are 11.7 
percentage points more likely to attend college than Christian boys, while Muslim girls are only 
0.2 percentage points more likely to attend college than Muslim boys. Although the difference 
between the two gender gaps is high (11.5 percentage points) and highly significant, the point   15
estimates still indicate that, even in poor families, Muslim girls are not less likely to attend 
college than their male counterparts (if anything they are slightly more likely).
10 
The next battery of robustness tests focuses on possible errors in the measurement of 
religion. Error in coding religion would introduce an attenuation bias in the estimation of the 
relationship between religion and gender gap and hence it could be the main cause of our finding 
of no relationship between religion and gender gap.
11 El-Khoury and Panizza (2005) use four 
different proxies to code religion for the Lebanese households. We start by showing that small 
differences in the coding of religion do not affect the results discussed so far. In fact, while this 
paper focuses on what El-Khoury and Panizza call Religion 2 (obtained by matching data from 
the electoral registry with households’ district of registration), columns 1-4 of Table 10 show that 
the results do not change when we use the other three religion codings (Religion1 matches 
electoral data with district of residence, Religion 3 matches district of residence with the CIA 
classification of the geographical distribution of Lebanese religious groups, Religion 4 matches 
the CIA data with district of registration).
12  
The first four columns of Table 10, however, do not address the issue of attenuation bias. 
After all, if all four definitions are measured with the same degree of imprecision, we would 
expect that all of them would have the same downward bias. Therefore, we use four different 
strategies to deal with the attenuation bias issue.  
First, we use the three alternative measures of religion as an instrument for Religion 2. 
The results (reported in columns 5, 6, and 7) show that the coefficient of FM is always 
insignificant (in one case it becomes positive).  
Second, we recognize that some districts are coded with greater precision than others. 
While the matching is perfect in districts where 100 percent of the population belong to a given 
religious group, other districts do not allow such a perfect matching. In particular, our sample 
contains districts that we code as belonging to a given religious group but where up to 20 percent 
of the registered population does not belong to that group. So, we re-estimate Equation 2 by 
                                                           
10 The estimations of Table 8 were obtained by using a linear probability model (that easily allows for fixed 
effects). Probit estimations yield similar results. 
11 Although measurement error in a binary regressor is non-classical and is correlated with the true value of 
the variable (Freeman, 1984), the direction of the bias is the same as with classical measurement error 
(Aigner, 1973). 
12 We also checked whether households who are originally from a district in which the majority of 
individuals are Muslim and live in a district where the majority of individuals are Muslim are different 
from similar households who live in a district where the majority of individuals are Christian. We find no 
difference between these two groups of households (full results are available upon request).     16
weighing each observation with the precision of the religious coding applied to that observation. 
For instance, we give weight 1 to observations that belong to districts in which 100 percent of the 
residents belong to the district’s main religious group and weight 0.8 to observations that belong 
to districts in which 80 percent of the residents belong to the district’s main religious group. 
Again, we find no significant difference between education gender gaps for Muslims and 
Christians (column 8 of Table 9).  
Our third strategy consists of reducing the sample to a set of districts where we have very 
precise information on religion. In particular, we focus on districts where at least 98 percent of 
the population belongs to a given religious group. Table 10 shows that the basic results are 
unchanged and that, if anything, we now find that the gender gap is lower among Muslims (the 
coefficient is statistically significant in the sample of households with educated mothers). The 
results are essentially identical if we restrict the sample to districts where 100 percent of the 
population belongs to the same religious groups or districts where 90 percent of the population 
belongs to the same religious group.  
Our forth strategy consists of exploring the role of polygamous households. These 
households are clearly Muslim (polygamy is illegal for Christians) and are likely to be more 
traditional than monogamous Muslim households. Table 4 already showed that the gender gap in 
polygamous households does not seem to be different from that prevalent in the whole 
population; Table 11 provides additional tests. In column 1, our basic specification is augmented 
with a term that interacts gender with a dummy variable that takes value one if the family is 
polygamous. This interaction term (FP) measures whether there is a difference between the 
gender gap of Muslim monogamous households and the gender gap of Muslim polygamous 
households.  The coefficient of FP is basically zero and not statistically significant, indicating 
that the gender gap for polygamous households is identical to that of the whole Muslim 
population. Column 2 drops FM from the regressions, in this setting FP should be interpreted as 
the differential between the gender gap of polygamous households and all other households (both 
Muslim and Christian) in the country. Also in this case, the coefficient of FP remains 
insignificant and, if anything, becomes positive (indicating a lower gender gap in polygamous 
households). As the sample of column 2 includes all available observations (even those for which 
we are unable to measure religion), in column 3 we repeat the same experiment by only including 
households for which we have information on religion. The results are unchanged (FP is now 
negative but not statistically significant and close to zero). The remaining three columns repeat   17
the regressions of column 2 restricting the sample to households with low wealth and low 
education of the father or the mother. As before, the coefficient of FP oscillates between being 
positive and negative but is never statistically significant.  
Finally, we deal with the fact that our sample only includes one-third of the residents of 
the city of Beirut.
13 So far, we looked at the effect of religion by coding religion for each 
household for which we had sufficient information. Table 12, instead, uses all available 
observations (including Beirut) and interacts the female dummy with the fraction of Muslims 
registered in each district. If the relationship between religion and gender gap is linear with 
respect to the fraction of Muslims who live in a given district, this methodology is identical to the 
one used so far and has the advantage of allowing us to use the whole sample of Lebanese 
households. We start by comparing the results obtained using all Lebanese households with the 
results obtained with the reduced sample used so far (i.e, Lebanese with individual information on 
religion). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 show that the two samples yield identical results and 
confirm the lack of any difference between the gender gap of Muslims and Christians. Columns 3 
to 7 show that household wealth and father’s education do not affect this result. As before, 
column 8 shows that the gender gap is slightly higher for Muslims only when we consider 
families where the mother has low education. Although statistically significant, the coefficient is 
extremely small indicating that the difference between the education gender gap of Muslims and 
Christians is less than 2 months.
14 Again, we find that girls (both Muslims and Christians) receive 
more education than their male counterparts, with the difference ranging between three and six 
months. 
  Our last battery of robustness checks concerns migration. Migration of Lebanese citizens 
was not only massive during the war but has continued in the post-war years. While we were not 
able to find any official estimate of post war migration, there are some claims that more than 
800,000 Lebanese (20 percent of the population) have left the country in the last decade.  This 
massive migration would not be a problem for our results if migration were random or, at least, 
not correlated with education gender gap. It is possible, however, to devise a scenario, in which 
such a correlation would exist. Let us assume that a series of factors makes it easier for more 
                                                           
13 Beirut is the district with the highest average wealth. If one believes that the difference between gender 
gaps should be larger in poorer and more traditional areas, excluding Beirut should bias the results against 
finding no difference between gender gaps. 
14 The point estimates suggest that the difference in gender gap between districts where 100 percent of the 
population is Muslim and districts where 100 percent of the population is Christian is equal to 0.151 years 
(or 1.8 months).     18
“open minded” Christians to emigrate but that “open mindedness” does not affect the probability 
of migration among Muslims (a possible explanation for this differential effect could be that a 
sizable share of Lebanese migration is directed towards conservative Gulf countries. Note that 
here we are launching ourselves into pure speculation and merely trying to build a case against 
our results). If this were the case, when we observe the sample of individuals who did remain in 
Lebanon we would observe a relatively high share of not “open minded” Christians compared 
with the share of not “open minded” Muslims. If we further assume that there is a positive 
correlation between being “open minded” and having preference for gender equality, then we 
would conclude that by not taking into account the differential effect of migration, we would 
underestimate the difference in gender gaps between Christians and Muslims. 
  The Lebanese household survey has some information on people who migrated during 
the 1993-1996 period. Although the survey seriously underestimates the extent of migration 
because it asks whether any individual in the household has migrated and then collects 
information on the characteristics of the individuals who have migrated (hence, failing to capture 
households in which all members have migrated), it does provide some information on the 
demographic characteristics of the migrants (age, gender, education) and allows testing whether 
Muslim migrants are different from Christian migrants. In the previous discussion, we mentioned 
that our results could be biased if Christian migrants are relatively more “open minded” than 
Muslim migrants. Clearly, we cannot measure “open mindedness”, however we can try to proxy 
it with education and test whether Muslims differ from Christians in the relationship between 
education and the probability of migrating.  In particular,  the above discussion would suggest 
that our results could be biased (in finding no differences in gender gap) if education has higher 
impact on the probability of migrating in Christians than in Muslims.   
  Table 13 reports the results of a Probit analysis where the dependent variable takes value 
one if the individual has migrated during the 1993-1996 period. The regressions include all 
surveyed individuals with ages between 18 and 60 years (the reported coefficients measure the 
marginal effects evaluated at the mean). In this sample, 1.3 percent of individuals are migrants; 
the figure increases to 2.3 percent for men and drops to 0.4 percent for women.  MUSLIM is a 
dummy variable that takes value one if the individual is a Muslim and measures whether Muslims 
are more or less likely to migrate than Christians. In most specifications, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. However, in column 5 (which only includes men), the coefficient is 
positive and marginally significant, indicating that Muslim men are more likely to migrate than   19
Christian men. Column 1 shows that the probability of migrating increases with years of 
education (EDUC). The coefficient, however, is small and indicates that adding one extra year of 
education for an individual with average education increases the probability of migrating by less 
than 0.1 percentage points.
15  EDUC*MUS is the interaction between MUSLIM and EDUC, 
which is our variable of interest because it measures whether there is a difference in the way in 
which education affects the probability of migration of Christian and Muslim individuals. If we 
were to find that EDUC*MUS is negative, then we would find evidence for the claim that 
educated Christians are more likely to migrate than educated Muslims and that this could be a 
source of bias for our finding of no difference between the gender gap of Christian and Muslim 
households. The regressions results, however, show that, if anything, EDUC*MUS is positive and 
marginally significant indicating that, relative to Christians, education has a higher impact on the 
probability of migrating for Muslims.  Column 2 repeats the experiment by introducing education 
squared and finds that the relationship between education and the probability to migrate is convex 
for Christians and basically linear for Muslims. Simulations based on the point estimates indicate 
that the impact of education on the probability of migrating tend to be higher for Muslims at all 
education levels. Column 3 controls for household wealth (the first quintile is the excluded 
dummy) and finds that the probability of migrating is positively correlated with wealth (here there 
could be reverse causality if migrants send remittances), but controlling for wealth does not affect 
the relationship between education and probability of migration. Column 4 controls for district 
fixed effects and obtains results that are basically identical to those of the previous columns.  
Columns 5 and 6 limit the sample to men and find that EDUC*MUS and EDUC2*MUS are never 
statistically significant.  As a whole, the evidence of Table 13 suggests that our result of no 
difference between gender gaps in Christian and Muslim households is unlikely to be driven by 
non-random migration (unless this non-randomness is only at work when the entire household 
migrates).  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to use individual-level data from Lebanon to test whether there is a 
difference between the education gender gap of young Christians and the education gender gap of 
                                                           
15 The regressions also control for age and for residence in urban areas. We find that the probability of 
migrating is concave with respect to age and is higher for residents of urban areas.   20
young Muslims. The paper finds no support for the hypothesis that Muslims discriminate against 
the education of girls. In particular, it finds that, other things equal, both Muslim and Christian 
girls receive more education than their male counterparts and that there is no significant (either 
statistical or economic) difference between the education gender gap of Muslims and Christians.  
These results are extremely robust to different specifications, definition of the variables, and sub-
samples. These results are surprising especially in the light of the large sample size that is likely 
to make even small differences statistically significant. 
The only sub-sample in which some regressions find a statistically significant difference 
between the gender gap of Christians and Muslims is the one that only includes households with 
mothers with low education. While one may argue that this could imply that more conservative 
Muslim men, who do not want to educate their daughters, marry poorly educated women (and 
hence mother’s education proxies for the degree of traditionalism of the household), it should be 
pointed out that even in the sub-sample with non-educated mothers, the difference between 
gender gaps is always very small. Furthermore, even in this sub-sample, we always find that girls 
(both Muslim and Christian) receive more education than boys.    
  One may argue that Lebanon is not representative because it is a fairly “westernized” 
society and its religious mix may reduce the bias against girls’ education that may characterize 
Muslim households in more homogeneous countries. We do not believe that this is the case. First 
of all, outside the city of Beirut religious groups are geographically segregated lending little 
support to the view that the religious mix may affect the view towards the education of girls.  
Furthermore, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) find no evidence that the prevalence of a 
given group within a given country affects the estimated relationship between religion and 
attitude towards women.  
Of course, rather than thinking of Lebanon as a “westernized” Muslim country, one could 
think of it as a “conservative” Christian country. Hence, the lack of difference between gender 
gaps would not be explained by lack of discrimination among Muslims but by the presence of 
discrimination among Christians. However, this view hardly agrees with the finding that 
Lebanese girls always receive more education than Lebanese boys.   21
References 
Aigner, Dennis (1973), “Regression with a Binary Independent Variable Subject to 
Errors of Observation,” Journal of Econometrics, 1, 49-60. 
 
Alderman, Harold and Paul Gertler (1997) “Family Resources and Gender Differences in Human 
Capital Investment,” in  H. Alderman, L. Haddad, and J. Hoddinott (eds)  Intrahousehold 
Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: Models, Methods, and Policy. Baltimore MD, 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Angrist Joshua and William Evans (1998) “Children and their Parents’ Labor Supply: Evidence 
from Exogenous Variation in Family Size,” The American Economic Review, 88: 450-477. 
 
Barro, Robert (2001) “Is Prosperity Next to Godliness?” Business Week, December 10. p. 24. 
 
Barro, Robert and Jong Wha Lee (1996) “International Measures of Schooling Years and 
Schooling Quality,” American Economic Review 86: 218-23. 
  
Barro, Robert and Rachel McCleary (2002) “Religion and Political Economy in an International 
Panel,” NBER Working Paper No. 8931. 
 
Barro, Robert and Rachel McCleary (2003) “International Determinants of Religiosity,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 10147. 
 
Becker, Gary and Nigel Tomes (1976) “Child Endowment and the Quantity and Quality of 
Children,” Journal of Political Economy, 84: 143-162. 
 
Berman, Eli (2003) "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View 
of Radical Religious Militias." NBER Working Paper No. 10004. 
 
Boone P. (1996) “Political and Gender Oppression as a Cause of Poverty,” LSE Centre for 
Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 294. 
 
Deolalikar, Anil (2002) “Poverty and Child Malnutrition in Bangladesh,” Background Paper 
prepared for the Bangladesh Poverty Assessment of the Asian Development Bank and World 
Bank. 
 
Dollar, David and Roberta Gatti (1999) “Gender Inequality, Income and Growth: Are Good 
Times Good for Women?” Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working paper 
No.1 The World Bank. 
 
El-Khoury Marianne and Ugo Panizza (2005) “Social Mobility and Religion, Evidence from 
Lebanon,” Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 16:  
 
Fallaci, Oriana (2001) La rabbia e l’orgoglio, Milan: Rizzoli (English edition The Rage and the 
Pride, New York: Rizzoli International). 
   22
Fghali, Kamal (1999) “The 1996 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections, Indicators and Results”, (in 
Arabic) Mokhtarat, Beirut, Lebanon. 
 
Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett (2001) “Estimating Wealth Effects Without Income or 
Expenditure Data – or Tears: Education Enrollment in India.” Demography 38. 
 
Filmer, Deon (1999) “The Structure of Social Disparities in Education: Gender and Wealth,” 
Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working Paper No.5 The World Bank. 
 
Freeman, Richard (1984), “Longitudinal Analyses of the Effects of Trade Unions,” 
Journal of Labor Economics, 2, 1-26. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (2001a) “History is Still Going Our Way,” The Wall Street Journal, October 
5. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (2001b) “Islam's Clash with Modernization,” Project Syndicate November 
2001. 
 
Glewwe, Paul, Hanan Jacoby, and Elizabeth King (2000) “Early Childhood Nutrition and 
Academic Achievement: A Longitudinal Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 81: 345-368.  
 
Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana, and Shoshana Neuman (1998) “The Extra Burden of Moslem 
Wives: Clues from Israeli Women's Labor Supply,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 
46: 491-517. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan (2005) “Religious Market Structure, Religious Participation, and Outcomes: Is 
Religion Good for You?” NBER Working Paper No. 11377. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2003) “People’s Opium? Religion and 
Economic Attitude,” Journal of Monetary Economics 50: 225-282. 
 
Hajj, Mandana and Ugo Panizza (2002) “Education, Childbearing and Female Labor Market 
Participation: Evidence from Lebanon,” Journal of Development and Economic Policies, 4: 43-
70. 
 
Huntington, Samuel (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Iannaccone, Laurence (1998) “Introduction to the Economics of Religion,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 36: 1465-1496. 
 
Iannaccone, Laurence (2003) “The Market for Martyrs,” mimeo, Mercatus Center George Mason 
University. 
 
Kazemi, Farhad (2000) “Gender, Islam, and Politics,” Social Research 27: 453-74 
   23
Keysar, Ariela and Barry Kosmin (1995) “The Impact of Religious Identification on Differences 
in Educational Attainment among American Women 1990” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 34: 49-62. 
 
Krueger, Alan and Jitka Maleckova (2002) “Education, Poverty, Political Violence and 
Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” NBER Working Paper No. 9074. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1999) “The 
Quality of Government,” Journal of Law Economics and Organization 15: 222-279. 
 
Lehrer, Evelyn (2005) “Religious Affiliation and Participation as Determinants of Women’s 
Educational Attainment and Wages,” IZA Discussion Paper 1725. 
 
Lehrer, Evelyn (1999) Religion as a Determinant of Educational Attainment: An Economic 
Perspective,” Social Science Research, 28: 358-379. 
 
Moaddel, Mansoor (1998) “Religion and Women: Islamic Modernism versus Fundamentalism,” 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37: 108-130. 
 
Noland, Marcus (2003) “Religion, Culture, and Economic Performance,” mimeo, Institute of 
International Economics 
 
Sacerdote, Bruce and Edward Glaeser (2001) “Education and Religion,” NBER Working Paper 
No. 8080.   24
Table 1: Education gender gap, cross-country regressions 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   ED25   ED15  Primary   Secondary 
GDP_PC -42.825  -25.440  -12.696  -33.839 
 (7.670)***  (3.931)***  (1.911)***  (7.785)*** 
Muslim 0.604  0.399  0.215  0.488 
 (0.147)***  (0.096)***  (0.055)***  (0.176)*** 
Other 0.434 0.238  0.021  0.019 
 (0.291)  (0.129)*  (0.045)  (0.121) 
Constant 676.198  403.117 198.292 526.055 
  (114.988)*** (60.677)*** (30.005)*** (120.868)*** 
Observations 98  98  121  111 
R-squared 0.48  0.50  0.41  0.32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 









Akkar 63.54  36.46  Hermel  100.00  0.00 
Aley 67.81  32.19  Jbeil  11.37  88.63 
Baabda 51.79  48.21  Jezzine  17.83  82.17 
Baalbak 83.23  16.78  Kesrouan  1.33  98.67 
Beirut 59.28  40.72  Marjeyoun  91.62  8.38 
Bint Jbeil  87.93  12.06  Nabatieh  99.32  0.68 
Bsharri 0.00  100.00  Rashaya  75.26  24.74 
El-Batroun 3.31  96.69  Sidon  90.00 10.00 
El-Koura 10.03  89.97  Tripoli 88.66  11.34 
El-Matn 0.00  100.00  Tyre 93.68  6.32 
El-Menie-Dennieh 84.53  15.48  West  Bequaa  83.27  16.72 
El-Shouf 65.81  34.19  Zahle  40.82  59.18 
Hasbaya 82.51  17.49  Zghorta  5.00  95.00 
Source: El-Khoury and Panizza (2001) 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics.  
  Average Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. N.Obs. 
  Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls   
  All Lebanese between the age of 7 and 20 who live with their parents 
Age 13.30  13.16  3.94  3.88  7  7  20  20  71,930 
Years of Educ.  5.65  5.94  3.41  3.49  0  0  16  16  71,511 
HH.  Wealth  0.33 0.33 0.09 0.09 0.05  0.5  0.66 0.66 71,930 
Father’s  educ.  6.00 5.99 5.05 5.02  0  0  18  18  71,915 
Mother’s  educ.  5.55 5.54 4.71 4.72  0  0  18  18  71,913 
  All Lebanese between the age of 7 and 20 who live with their parents 
and for which we have information on religion 
Age 13.30  13.14  3.94  3.89  7  7  20  20  42,450 
Years of Educ.  5.63  5.97  3.37  3.45  0  0  16  16  42,173 
HH.  Wealth  0.32 0.32 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.66 0.66 42,450 
Father’s  educ.  5.79 5.77 4.95 4.92  0  0  18  18  42,434 
Mother’s  educ.  5.31 5.32 4.60 4.62  0  0  18  18  42,431 
  Muslims between the age of 7 and 20 who live with their parents 
Age 13.23  13.01  3.93  3.87  7  7  20  20  32,543 
Years of Educ.  5.37  5.66  3.29  3.33  0  0  16  16  32,360 
HH.  Wealth  0.31 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.66 0.66 32,543 
Father’s  educ.  5.38 5.37 4.90 4.87  0  0  18  18  32,533 
Mother’s  educ.  4.65 4.67 4.46 4.48  0  0  18  18  32,532 
  Christians between the age of 7 and 20 who live with their parents 
Age 13.53  13.55  3.96  3.94  7  7  20  20  9,907 
Years of Educ.  6.47  6.97  3.50  3.60  0  0  16  16  9,813 
HH.  Wealth  0.36 0.36 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.62 0.62  9,907 
Father’s  educ.  7.15 7.10 4.90 4.85  0  0  18  18  9,899 




   26
Table 4: Basic regressions (dependent variable: years of education) 




























FEMALE 0.422  0.445  0.492 0.400 0.451 0.471  0.309 
  (0.016)*** (0.021)*** (0.040)*** (0.017)*** (0.022)*** (0.049)***  (0.15)** 
MUSLIM     -0.075        
     (0.060)        
FM     -0.061    -0.026   
     (0.047)    (0.055)   
AGE 1.232  1.290  1.290  1.265 1.337 1.337  1.260 
  (0.016)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.016)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)***  (0.141)*** 
AGE2  -0.023 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.029 -0.029  -0.034 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
WEALTH 18.687  17.301  17.287         
 (0.887)***  (1.166)***  (1.167)***         
WEALTH2 -17.081  -14.510  -14.517         
 (1.207)***  (1.587)***  (1.588)***         
ED_FATH 0.119  0.111  0.111         
 (0.008)***  (0.010)***  (0.010)***         
ED_FATH2 -0.005  -0.004  -0.004         
 (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***         
AGE_FATH -0.008 -0.004 -0.003         
 (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.018)         
AGE_FATH2 0.000  0.000  0.000         
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)         
ED_MOTH 0.214  0.219  0.218         
 (0.008)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)***         
ED_MOTH2 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012         
 (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***         
AGE_MOTH 0.162  0.145  0.144         
 (0.016)***  (0.021)***  (0.021)***         
AGE_MOTH2 -0.002  -0.002  -0.002         
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***         
FA_WORKS 0.034  0.033  0.033         
 (0.041)  (0.054)  (0.054)         
MO_WORKS 0.076  0.040  0.039         
 (0.037)**  (0.052)  (0.052)         
N_CHILD -0.138  -0.141  -0.140         
 (0.009)***  (0.012)***  (0.012)***         
CONSTANT -14.282 -14.102 -14.017  -6.229 -6.696 -6.696  -6.163 
  (0.352)*** (0.460)*** (0.461)*** (0.106)*** (0.138)*** (0.138)***  (0.895)*** 
N.OBS.  71473 42151 42151 71511 42173 42173  981 
R2  0.62 0.61 0.61 0.54 0.54 0.54  0.33 
N. HHS  INCLUDE DISTRICT FIXED EFFECTS 
Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level 
28259 16392 16392  283 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
   27
Table 5: Regressions by socio-economic groups (dependent variable: years of education) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 








FEMALE  0.351  0.576  0.293 0.583 0.224 0.686 
  (0.057)***  (0.070)***  (0.055)*** (0.070)*** (0.047)*** (0.077)*** 
FM  0.071  -0.161  0.001 -0.097  0.056 -0.221 
  (0.069)  (0.076)**  (0.064) (0.077) (0.058) (0.083)*** 
AGE  1.282  1.400  1.108 1.340 1.155 1.317 
  (0.031)***  (0.026)***  (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** 
AGE2  -0.018 -0.035 -0.012  -0.032  -0.012  -0.032 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
CONST.  -6.830 -6.947 -5.724  -6.525  -6.092  -6.397 
  (0.202)***  (0.169)***  (0.174)*** (0.183)*** (0.167)*** (0.180)*** 
N.  OBS.  14562  27611  15451 26706 15198 26966 
N.  HHS  6519  9873  6579 9807 6799 9589 
R2  0.77  0.44  0.78 0.42 0.81 0.42 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All 
regressions include household fixed effects     
 
 
Table 6: First Child effect (dependent variable: years of education) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 










FEMALE  0.461 0.389 0.516 0.340 0.517 0.240 0.613 
  (0.057)*** (0.068)*** (0.080)*** (0.066)*** (0.080)*** (0.056)*** (0.087)*** 
FM  -0.030 0.051  -0.121 -0.051 -0.047 0.031  -0.161 
  (0.063) (0.081) (0.086) (0.076) (0.087) (0.069) (0.093)* 
AGE  1.261 1.222 1.330 1.051 1.290 1.102 1.277 
  (0.022)*** (0.031)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** 
AGE2  -0.027 -0.017 -0.033 -0.011 -0.032 -0.012 -0.031 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
CHILD1  1.055 0.601 0.942 0.684 0.893 0.457 0.754 
  (0.074)*** (0.084)*** (0.108)*** (0.078)*** (0.112)*** (0.068)*** (0.127)*** 
FMUCHILD1 0.062  0.063  -0.103  0.202  -0.195  0.094  -0.269 
  (0.126) (0.155) (0.178) (0.139) (0.186) (0.125) (0.205) 
FECHILD1 -0.002  -0.146  0.206  -0.179  0.273  -0.064  0.344 
  (0.110) (0.126) (0.161) (0.117) (0.167) (0.101) (0.189)* 
MUCHILD1  -0.653 -0.225 -0.569 -0.431 -0.585 -0.246 -0.439 
 (0.083)***  (0.101)**  (0.117)***  (0.090)*** (0.123)*** (0.081)*** (0.136)*** 
CONST. -6.069 -6.340 -6.383 -5.278 -6.090 -5.678 -6.030 
  (0.141)*** (0.207)*** (0.173)*** (0.178)*** (0.186)*** (0.173)*** (0.183)*** 
N.  OBS. 42173 14562 27611 15451 26706 15198 26966 
N.  HHS.  16392  6519 9873 6579 9807 6799 9589 
R2  0.55 0.77 0.45 0.79 0.43 0.81 0.43 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All 
regressions  include  household  fixed  effects        
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Table 7: Only individuals 11 or older (dependent variable: years of education) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 










FEMALE  0.601 0.431 0.722 0.376 0.694 0.241 0.864 
  (0.067)*** (0.080)*** (0.094)*** (0.080)*** (0.091)*** (0.069)*** (0.099)*** 
FM  -0.044 0.125  -0.195 0.010  -0.093 0.118  -0.282 
  (0.075) (0.096) (0.103)*  (0.094) (0.100) (0.086) (0.107)*** 
AGE 1.623 1.702 1.648 1.479 1.550 1.513 1.560 
  (0.063)*** (0.090)*** (0.079)*** (0.086)*** (0.079)*** (0.085)*** (0.078)*** 
AGE2  -0.037 -0.031 -0.042 -0.023 -0.039 -0.024 -0.039 
  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
CONST. -8.920  -10.110  -8.949  -8.553 -8.176 -8.829 -8.299 
  (0.473)*** (0.685)*** (0.592)*** (0.649)*** (0.600)*** (0.636)*** (0.591)*** 
N.  OBS.  29637 10459 19178 9994  19633 9686  19944 
N.  HHS  13140  5265 7875 4857 8277 4901 8236 
R2  0.31 0.60 0.20 0.63 0.20 0.67 0.20 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All 
regressions include household fixed effects             
 
Table 8: Probability of attending college  
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 










FEMALE  0.074  0.023 0.117  0.022 0.095  0.096 0.067 
  (0.029)** (0.056)  (0.031)*** (0.062)  (0.031)*** (0.062)  (0.031)** 
FM  -0.038 0.103 -0.115  0.040 -0.067  0.001 -0.048 
  (0.033) (0.069)  (0.034)***  (0.075)  (0.035)* (0.082)  (0.034) 
AGE  0.245  1.116 0.023  0.636 0.064  0.982 0.048 
  (0.547)  (1.338)  (0.506) (1.433)  (0.535) (1.565)  (0.512) 
AGE2  -0.004  -0.025 0.001  -0.012 -0.000  -0.021 0.000 
  (0.014)  (0.035)  (0.013) (0.038)  (0.014) (0.041)  (0.013) 
CONST.  -2.935 -11.747  -0.612  -7.291  -1.022  -10.745  -0.836 
  (5.185)  (12.689)  (4.795) (13.586)  (5.072) (14.844)  (4.859) 
N. OBS.  7612  2858 4754  2186 5425  2092 5518 
N. HHS  6041  2378 3663  1793 4247  1737 4303 
R2  0.09  0.18 0.06  0.20 0.06  0.23 0.05 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  All 
regressions include household fixed effects           
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Table 9: Robustness analysis, different religion coding, instrumental variables and weighted 
estimations (dependent variable: years of education) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 Fixed  effects 
Religion is measured with: 
Instrumental Variables and FE. 
Religion is measured with Religion 2 
and the instrument is: 
Weighted 
FE 
 Religion2  Religion1  Religion3  Religion4  Religion1  Religion3  Religion4   
FEMALE  0.471 0.450 0.453 0.450 0.493 0.454 0.438  0.490 
  (0.049)***  (0.042)*** (0.039)*** (0.035)*** (0.057)*** (0.069)*** (0.092)***  (0.050)*** 
FM  -0.026 -0.006 -0.064 -0.089 -0.040 -0.011  0.010  -0.030 
 (0.055)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.044)**  (0.067)  (0.078)  (0.107)  (0.058) 
AGE  1.337 1.299 1.270 1.288 1.340 1.351 1.367  1.345 
  (0.021)***  (0.022)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.025)***  (0.024)*** 
AGE2 -0.029  -0.027  -0.027  -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 -0.030  -0.029 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
CONST. -6.696  -6.462  -6.254  -6.355 -6.686 -6.802 -6.876  -6.731 
  (0.138)***  (0.139)*** (0.127)*** (0.130)*** (0.151)*** (0.156)*** (0.162)***  (0.152)*** 
N.OBS. 42173  41852 49508 46461 35515 32030 29205  35094 
N.  HHS 16392  16382 18772 17302 13663 12037 10814  13605 
R2  0.54  0.53 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.52  0.83 
Standard errors in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All 
regressions include household fixed effects           
 
Table 10: Robustness analysis using only districts where more than 98 percent of 
individuals belong to one religious group (dependent variable: years of education) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 All 
Lebanese 










FEMALE  0.402 0.383 0.434 0.185 0.533 0.058 0.762 
 (0.071)***  (0.077)***  (0.114)***  (0.076)** (0.104)***  (0.066)  (0.118)*** 
FM  0.117 0.156 0.086 0.051 0.062 0.334 -0.229 
 (0.099)  (0.136)  (0.141)  (0.118)  (0.137)  (0.116)***  (0.146) 
AGE  1.338 1.270 1.483 1.044 1.377 1.108 1.349 
 (0.047)***  (0.060)***  (0.064)***  (0.056)*** (0.065)*** (0.052)*** (0.067)*** 
AGE2  -0.026 -0.016 -0.037 -0.008 -0.031 -0.009 -0.031 
 (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
CONST. -6.890 -7.007 -7.524 -5.475 -6.941 -5.978 -6.679 
 (0.304)***  (0.395)***  (0.408)***  (0.354)*** (0.423)*** (0.327)*** (0.438)*** 
N.  OBS.  8951 4252 4699 3707 5244 4057 4889 
N.  HHS 3995 2107 1888 1787 2208 1995 1999 
R2  0.59 0.77 0.48 0.81 0.48 0.83 0.46 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All 
regressions include household fixed effects       
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Table 11: Polygamous Households (dependent variable: years of education) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 All  Lebanese 









All with father 
Low education 
All with mother 
Low education 
FEMALE 0.471  0.398  0.451  0.413  0.449  0.442 
 (0.049)***  (0.017)***  (0.022)*** (0.022)***  (0.023)***  (0.023)*** 
FM -0.026           
 (0.055)          
FP -0.001  0.048  -0.007  -0.066  0.027  -0.056 
 (0.142)  (0.140)  (0.141)  (0.153) (0.162)  (0.162) 
AGE 1.337  1.265  1.337  1.325  1.265  1.238 
 (0.021)***  (0.016)***  (0.021)*** (0.021)***  (0.022)***  (0.022)*** 
AGE2 -0.029  -0.026  -0.029  -0.032  -0.030  -0.029 
 (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
CONST. -6.696  -6.229  -6.696  -6.489  -6.041  -5.888 
 (0.138)***  (0.106)***  (0.138)*** (0.132)***  (0.141)***  (0.140)*** 
N.  OBS.  42173 71511 42173 45635  44272  44103 
N.  HHS 16392 28259 16392 16497  16378  15783 
R2  0.54 0.54 0.54 0.44  0.42  0.42 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All 
regressions include household fixed effects   
 
 
Table 12: Robustness analysis (dependent variable: years of education) 

















FEMALE  0.406 0.445 0.323 0.462 0.253 0.508 0.225 0.540 
  (0.038)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)*** (0.052)*** (0.044)*** (0.053)*** (0.038)*** (0.056)*** 
F*FRM -0.011 0.009 0.003 -0.078 -0.010 -0.092 0.029 -0.151 
  (0.056) (0.064) (0.073) (0.073) (0.068) (0.075) (0.062)  (0.079)* 
AGE  1.265 1.337 1.241 1.325 1.103 1.265 1.150 1.238 
  (0.016)*** (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** 
AGE2  -0.026 -0.029 -0.017 -0.032 -0.011 -0.030 -0.012 -0.029 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
CONST.  -6.229 -6.696 -6.544 -6.488 -5.676 -6.040 -6.051 -5.888 
  (0.106)*** (0.138)*** (0.152)*** (0.132)*** (0.132)*** (0.141)*** (0.125)*** (0.140)*** 
N.  OBS. 71511 42173 25876 45635 27212 44272 27393 44103 
N.  HHS 28259 16392 11762 16497 11870 16378 12469 15783 
RW  0.54 0.54 0.77 0.44 0.79 0.42 0.81 0.42 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include household fixed effects          
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Table 13: Probability of Migration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















MUSLIM  0.00170 -0.00099 0.00001 -0.00284 0.00827 0.00064 
  (0.00132) (0.00201) (0.00184) (0.00215)  (0.00467)*  (0.00532) 
EDUC  0.00070 -0.00077 -0.00109 -0.00094 -0.00140 -0.00110 
 (0.00011)***  (0.00040)*  (0.00038)***  (0.00034)***  (0.00112)  (0.00102) 
EDUC2    0.00008 0.00008 0.00007 0.00014 0.00011 
   (0.00002)***  (0.00002)***  (0.00002)***  (0.00006)**  (0.00005)** 
EDUC*MUS  0.00024 0.00090 0.00089 0.00076 0.00115 0.00080 
  (0.00013)*  (0.00044)** (0.00042)** (0.00038)**  (0.00122)  (0.00111) 
EDUC2*MUS    -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00003 
    (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
FEMALE  -0.01627 -0.01647 -0.01618 -0.01463     
  (0.00070)*** (0.00070)*** (0.00069)*** (0.00066)***     
AGE  0.00008 0.00007 0.00010 0.00007 0.00084 0.00071 
  (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00013)  (0.00039)**  (0.00035)** 
AGE2  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00002 -0.00002 
  (0.00000)**  (0.00000)**  (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00001)*** (0.00000)*** 
URBAN  -0.00158 -0.00162 -0.00262 -0.00061 -0.00603 -0.00121 
 (0.00066)**  (0.00067)**  (0.00070)***  (0.00061)  (0.00174)***  (0.00155) 
QUINTILE=2      0.00271 0.00273 0.00577 0.00590 
      (0.00115)** (0.00106)** (0.00272)** (0.00252)** 
QUINTILE=2      0.00677 0.00638 0.01338 0.01272 
      (0.00139)*** (0.00130)*** (0.00312)*** (0.00292)*** 
QUINTILE=2      0.01052 0.01002 0.02093 0.02020 
      (0.00166)*** (0.00158)*** (0.00362)*** (0.00345)*** 
QUINTILE=2      0.01222 0.01179 0.02260 0.02276 
      (0.00189)*** (0.00181)*** (0.00404)*** (0.00393)*** 






Observations  91514 91514 91514 91172 44644 44479 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses        
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